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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
DESERT CENTERS, INC., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
GLEN CANYON, INC., THEODORE 
I. GEURTS, KYLE BREWSTER, and 
HARRY D. PUGSLEY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
9262 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties are referred to herein as they appeared 
belo\v in an action to quiet title in Plaintiff to lands in Kane 
County. 
On December 1, 1957 the Defendant Glen Canyon, Inc., 
was a Utah Corporation with principal offices at 556 Gale 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah; on that date a special meeting 
of its Board of Directors was held, at which a quorum was 
present (R. 1-11). At that meeting a resolution was adopted 
reading as follows: 
"Mr. LaVey submitted a proposal from the Des-
ert Centers, Inc., of Phoenix, Arizona, an Arizona 
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Corporation, to finance, build, lease, and operate a 
shopping center on Lot No. 1, Glen Canyon Utah 
Townsite. 
"In consideration of a Warranty Deed being 
given them to Lot No. 1, William B. LaVey and as-
sociates agree to pay Glen Canyon, Inc. 60,000 
shares of stock in exchange for this lot. A motion 
was made, seconded and passed that this be ac-
cepted." 
The resolution was then embodied in a completed set of 
minutes of the meeting and executed by all present. This 
resolution was admitted into evidence by the pre-trial Order 
(R. 12) and by stipulation of the parties (R. 132) and a 
fully executed but carbon copy thereof was admitted by 
the Court as Exhibit "D" (R. 141). 
On December 3, 1957, a Warranty Deed was executed 
by the officers of Glen Canyon, Inc., attested by its secretary 
and acknowledged before a Notary Public conveying the 
aforesaid Lot 1 of Glen Canyon Townsite to the Plaintiff, 
Desert Centers, Inc. This deed was recorded July 2, 1958 
in Book N -5 of Deeds, at Page 433 of the Kane County rec-
ords. This deed was likewise admitted into evidence through 
pre-trial negotiations (R. 11), and at the time of trial (R. 
24) as Exhibit "A" (R. 136). The deed and acknowledgment 
are in statutory form and content. 
Also admitted into evidence but only cumulatively evi-
dentiary of the facts was a pre-corporation agreement (R. 
137-139), which became Exhibit "B" and was admitted at 
the pre-trial (R. 13). 
After receiving the deed from the defendant Glen Can-
yon, Inc., the President and Secretary, S. S. Gittleman and 
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Belle Gittleman, respectively, of the newly formed Desert 
Centers, Inc., paid $15,000.00 into an account for their con-
tribution to the capital of Desert Centers, Inc., as they had 
agreed to do in the pre-corporation agreement (R. 147). 
Thereafter there was checked out the sum of $7,500.00 to 
Rincon Builders and Developers., Inc. as a down payment 
on the construction of a shopping center on the said Lot 1. 
Photostatic copies of those checks appear as an exhibit at 
Page 142 of the record and the actual checks themselve·s 
together with bank statements of the contributors of the 
cash and bank statements of Desert Centers, Inc. appear 
at Page 147 as exhibits which were accepted by the Court 
at the insistence of counsel for Glen Canyon, Inc. (R. 34, 
R. 38, R. 127). 
The pre-trial Order by stipulation provided that the 
title of Glen Canyon, Inc., at the time of the conveyance, 
Exhibit "A", by Warranty Deed to Desert Centers, Inc., 
would not be and was not attacked in the proceedings. 
On April 28, 1958 Glen Canyon, Inc., by Theodore I. 
Geurts as President (a party defendant) and Gordon C. 
Holt as Secretary, executed a Quitclaim Deed to Harry D. 
Pugsley, "Trustee", and said deed was recorded on June 
26, 1958 in Book N-5 of Deeds at Page 428, and prior to the 
time the Plaintiff recorded its deed. 
Harry D. Pugsley was made a party defendant to this 
action; however, by his answer per se he admitted that he 
was a Trustee only for Glen Canyon, Inc.; that he dis-
claimed any personal interest in the land but held title for 
the Defendant Glen Canyon, Inc. solely as Trustee and was 
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neither a purchaser for value or without notice of the prior 
deed to Plaintiff. 
The evidence of the Plaintiff was almost entirely docu-
mentary and was largely presented and admitted at pre-
trial. The Plaintiff called only two witnesses, the president 
and secretary of the Plaintiff corporation, for the purpose 
of proving that they had put in all the cash capital ($15,-
000.00) of the Plaintiff Corporation. A long colloquy en-
sued by objections of Defendants' counsel to their testimony 
which is hardly useful in deciding this case but which ap-
pears in the transcript ( R. 5-48) . 
These witnesses were asked and testified on cross ex-
amination concerning their salaries as officers, the make-up 
of the Plaintiff corporation's Board of Directors, and other 
matters which we submit are wholly irrelevant to reach 
back and nullify a pre-existing deed but which apparently 
influenced the Trial Court to a view that possibly Glen 
Canyon, Inc. could have made a better deal if they had their 
land back. This he proceeded to make provision for. The 
Defendants called no \Yitnesses except for the attorney for 
the Defendants, ~Ir. J. Richard Bell, who testified concern-
ing his observations of the endorsement on the checks (ad-
mitted as exhibits at R. 147) since those checks were not 
available at the time of trial but were supplied later. His 
testilnony contained assun1ptions and conclusions which 
proved to be erroneous (R. 8, 9, 147). 
Upon the basis of this evidence the trial Court found: 
"That there is so much uncertainty and irregu-
larity, so much inequity and unfairness as related 
to Glen Canyon, Inc. as to render the entire transac-
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tion, including the alleged deed from Glen Canyon, 
Inc. to the Plaintiff, Desert Centers, Inc., void and 
of no effect" ( R. 17). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE, AND CERTAINLY 
NO CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, 
ATTACKING VALIDITY OF PLAINTIFF'S 
DEED AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
FINDING IT INVALID. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE, AND CERTAINLY 
NO CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, 
ATTACKING VALIDITY OF PLAINTIFF'S 
DEED AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
FINDING IT INVALID. 
It is fundamental that the regularity of a deed such 
as is Exhibit "A", is presumed where the same is executed, 
acknowledged and recorded and that any individual attack-
ing the same must do so by only clear and convincing evi-
dence. Chugg vs. Chugg, 342 Pacific 2nd 875, 9 Utah 2nd 
256. 
It is further elementary that a deed, whether or not 
recorded, is binding between the parties. Section 57-1-6, U. 
C. A. 1953. In this case conveyance by Glen Canyon, Inc. 
to a "Trustee" for the grantor's own benefit had no effect 
'vhatsoever. 
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It is equally fundamental that there is no necessity 
that any consideration passed; however, in this case new 
equities arose and the grantor received consideration for 
the transaction since two incorporators, as they agreed to 
do in the pre-corporation agreement (Exhibit "B", R. 137-
139), provided all the cash ($15,000.00) with which Desert 
Centers commenced business (R. 147). Glen Canyon, by the 
Articles of Incorporation of Desert Centers, received 49% 
of the capital stock of the latter corporation. 
Further it should be observed that the consideration 
for the deed recited in the resolution of the Board of Direc-
tors (R. 141) had nothing to do with cash or performance 
of any pre-corporation agreement, but was in consideration 
of shares of Glen Canyon's own stock to be transferred by 
William B. LaVey to the corporation, presumably to become 
treasury stock. The Defendants came forward with no proof 
that this stock was not delivered by LaVey and the burden 
was upon them to do so. Chugg vs. Chugg, supra. 
No doubt the Defendants will claim a great deal for 
the Defendant Glen Canyon, Inc.'s lack of a stock certificate 
evidencing shares in Desert Centers, Inc. The pre-corpora-
tion agreement (Exhibit "B", R. 137) provided that the De-
fendant should own 49% of the Plaintiff Corporation. 
Glen Canyon, Inc. now is, and ever since the organiza-
tion of Desert Centers, Inc. has been, a stockholder therein, 
owning 49% of its capital stock. This point may be disposed 
of conclusively by reference to the following citations from 
American Jurisprudence: 
Vol. 13, p. 397; Corporations Sec. 319 : 
"A stock certificate is not stock in the corpora-
tion, but is merely evidence of the holder's interest 
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in the corporation, his ownership of the shares rep-
resented thereby, and his rights and liabilities re-
sulting from such ownership. It is authentic evi-
dence of the title to stock. 
"A stock certificate is not essential to the ex-
istence of a share of stock or to the creation of the 
relation of shareholder; the interest represented by 
the certificate may be held by a valid title \vithout 
a certificate. A certificate of stock is generally rec-
ognized as occupying much the same status as a 
chose in action." 
Vol. 13, p. 455; Corporations Sec. 398; 
"To constitute one a stockholder, some sort of 
subscription or contract, express or implied, is re-
quired, whereby he obtains the right, upon some 
condition, to demand stock and to exercise the rights 
of a stockholder. Generally, it may be said that in 
the absence of a regulation to the contrary, one may 
beco1ne a stockholder by subscribing for stock in 
a corporation, paying the amount thereof to the cor-
poration or its proper officer, and being entered on 
the book as a stockholder, even though no stock cer-
t1'ficate ?·s issued to him; for although a corpora.tion 
1·s bound upon demand to issue to anyone who has 
fully paid for stock in the corporation, it is not nec-
essary in order to constitute one a stockholder in a 
co1·poration that the stock certificate to ~vhich he is 
entitled be actually issued. Nor is payment by a sub-
scriber for the stock necessary to constitute the sub-
scriber a stockholder." 
The proceedings represented by the documentary ex-
hibits constituted a fully executed transaction upon execu-
tion of the 'Varranty Deed on December 3, 1957. 
We respectfully submit that nothing more can be proved 
with respect to a corporate conveyance of land than has 
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been established in this case 1. e. : ( 1) Authorization of 
the conveyance by the Board of Directors of the conveying 
corporation and (2) Execution and delivery of a \Varranty 
Deed statutory in form, content and acknowledgment. 
Certainly parol evidence cannot be received by the 
Court to defeat any of these written documents which are 
unequivocal, unambiguous and consistent in every respect 
with the conveying corporation's ordinary course of busi-
ness. It should be remembered in this connection that Glen 
Canyon, Inc.'s express corporate purpose is the subdividing 
and development of land and the purposes set out in the pre-
corporation (Exhibit "B") agreement are in furtherance 
of that purpose. 
The rule is certainly fundamental that a Court may not 
attempt to re-write a contract for the parties or second-
guess the wisdom in its provisions. This is true even of ex-
ecutory agreements; however, the Trial Court in this case 
has bone much farther than a mere abrogation of that rule; 
it has modified and revised a contract completely executed 
as to all of its terms. 
It is significant that the Defendants called no witnesses 
except their counsel. The Court should consider the fact 
that the Defendants produced no evidence of any weight in 
light of the holdings in Richmond vs. Ballard, 7 Utah 2d 
341, 325 P. 2d 839 and Northcrest, Inc., vs. Walker Bank, 
122 Utah 268, 248 P. 2d 692, which hold that acknowledg-
ment and recording of deeds give rise to a presumption of 
genuineness and due execution and is prima facie evi-
dence thereof and must be overcome only by clear and con-
vincing proof. 
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!laving come forward with no proof the Defendants 
nevertheless expect this Court to strike down a deed of con-
veyance which has been proved by the minutes of a meeting 
of the Board of Directors of the corporation executing the 
same, containing recitations therein of consideration, and 
b~· a statutory deed, acknow I edged and recorded. 
If the Trial Court's judgment is allowed to stand, there 
is no corporation in existence which has undergone a change 
in management whose current Board of Directors cannot 
look back into its predecessor officialdom and set aside some 
transaction which was not as good a deal as the present 
board, with 20-20 hindsight, could have struck. 
CO·NCLUSION 
In conclusion we respectfully urge that the Trial Court 
erred in denying Plaintiff relief and in granting the Defen-
dants judgment on their Counter-Claim. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN, 
76 South Main, 
Richfield, Utah, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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